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THE SPLENDID DURABILITY OF THE PROVISIONAL:
A TRIBUTE TO EURATOM
Jakub Handrlica ∗
Summary: Sixty years ago, on 1 January 1958, the Treaty establish-
ing the European Atomic Energy Community of 1957 entered into force. 
In contrast to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community of 1951, the Treaty establishing the European Atomic En-
ergy Community of 1957 did not provide for any explicit limitation of 
the Community’s existence in its provisions. As a consequence, the key 
provisions of the Treaty, establishing the Community’s powers and 
competences, have remained virtually untouched until today. This ar-
ticle analyses this Community from three different perspectives. First-
ly, attention is paid to the clauses enabling prospective amendments, 
adjustments, and further speciﬁ cation of the scope of application. 
Consequently, it is argued that to some extent the Community was 
originally designed as a ‘provisional’ one.  Secondly, the article deals 
with those provisions of the Euratom Treaty which originally provid-
ed for certain competences of the Community in nuclear research, the 
supply of ores, source materials and special ﬁ ssile materials and the 
insurance of nuclear liability. Due to the fact that these competenc-
es have never been used, it is argued that from this perspective the 
Euratom Community can be viewed as a ‘static’ Community. Thirdly, 
the extensive interpretation of the Euratom competences in the area 
of health and safety by the Court of Justice will be addressed. Based 
on this extensive interpretation, the Euratom Community launched its 
legislative activity in the area of nuclear safety in order to address this 
key issue of peaceful use of nuclear energy. From this perspective, the 
Community is to be regarded a ‘ﬂ exible’ one. The 60th anniversary of 
the Euratom Treaty represents a good opportunity to revisit in detail 
the characteristic features of the Euratom Community from these dif-
ferent perspectives. 
1. Introduction
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Communi-
ty (hereinafter: the Treaty) was signed by the representatives of the six 
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States1 in Rome on 25 March 1957.2 Pursuant to its Article 224, the 
Treaty entered into force on the ﬁ rst day of the month following the de-
posit of the instrument of ratiﬁ cation by the last signatory State to take 
this step, ie on 1 January 1958. The intentions of the six States were 
laid down in the Preamble to the Treaty: the Euratom Community was 
established as a reﬂ ection of the belief that ‘nuclear energy represents 
an essential resource for the development and invigoration of industry 
and will permit the advancement of the cause of peace’. Consequently, 
the six States intended on one hand to ‘create the conditions necessary 
for the development of a powerful nuclear industry which will provide 
extensive energy resources, lead to the modernisation of technical pro-
cesses and contribute, through its many other applications, to the pros-
perity of their peoples’, and on the other hand to ‘create the conditions 
of safety necessary to eliminate hazards to the life and health of the 
public’. Facing contemporary developments,3 the Preamble of the Treaty 
highlighted that the joint effort of the six States must be ‘undertaken 
without delay’.
Taking the intentions of the six governments into regard, one can 
easily understand that the provisions of the Treaty directly aim at 
supporting the development of the nuclear industry through the new-
ly established Community. The Contracting Parties established the 
competences of the Community in ten areas,4 seven of which explicit-
ly address the further development of the nuclear industry. The three 
remaining areas cover issues of the protection of health against the 
dangers arising from ionising radiation, safeguards, and international 
relations. All these areas are the subject of regulation by Title II of the 
Euratom Treaty.  
1 Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
2 See E Conze, ‘La coopération franco-germano-italienne dans le domaine nucléaire dans 
les années 1957−1958’ (1990) 104(1) Revue d’historié diplomatique 115; M Dumoulin, P 
Guillen and M Vaïsse, L’énergie nucléaire en Europe: Des origines à Euratom (Peter Lang 
1994) 11; P Guillen, ‘La France et la négociation des traités de Rome: l’Euratom’ in E Ser-
ra (ed), Relance Européenne et les traités de Rome (Bruylant 1989); H Nieburg, ‘European 
Atomic Energy Community: A Study in Coalition Politics’ (1963) 15(3) World Politics 597; 
P Weilemann, ‘Die deutsche Haltung während der Euratom-Verhaltungen’ in E Serra (ed), 
Relance Européenne et les traités de Rome (Bruylant 1989). 
3 It was the publication of the ‘Armand Report’ in 1955 which urged the governments of 
the six States to commence the construction of their own nuclear industry immediately to 
address the risk of a prospective shortage of energy resources. 
4 Promotion of research (Chapter 1, Articles 4−11), dissemination of information (Chapter 
2, Articles 12−29), health and safety (Chapter 3, Articles 30−39), investments (Chapter 4, 
Articles 40−44), joint undertakings (Chapter 5, Articles 45−51), supplies (Chapter 6, Arti-
cles 52−76), safeguards (Chapter 7, Articles 77−85), property ownership (Chapter 8, Articles 
86−91), the common nuclear market (Chapter 9, Articles 92−99), international relations 
(Chapter 10, Articles 101−106). 
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During the 1950s and 1960s, the establishment of Euratom trig-
gered relatively wide interest from legal academia.5 Euratom became the 
subject of several dissertations6 and the Brussels-based ‘Librairie en-
cyclopédique’ published the ﬁ rst commentary on the provisions of the 
Treaty.7 However, further developments caused a waning of academic 
interest in the Euratom Community. During the 1970s, it became clear 
that Euratom’s competences would not be executed in the way the Trea-
ty had foreseen, a fact described by some authors as the ‘ﬁ nal crisis 
of Euratom’.8 In the following decades, Euratom triggered academic at-
tention only occasionally, in particular with regard to its immunity to 
any amendments or changes.9 Subsequently, the Euratom Community 
was referred to as being ‘like a Chinese girl-child, exposed after birth 
5 See K Cohen, ‘European Atomic Energy Community’ (1959) 7(1) Journal of Industrial 
Economics 79; R Efron and A Nanes, ‘The Common Market and Euratom Treaties: Supra-
nationality and the Integration of Europe’ (1957) 6(4) ICLQ 670; M Gaudet, ‘Euratom’ in JL 
Weinstein (ed), Progress in Nuclear Energy. Law and Administration (Pergamon Press 1959); 
S Gorove, ‘Lessons from the Control of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Euratom’ 
(1964) 58 American Society of International Law Proceedings 136; H Hahn, ‘Control under 
Euratom Compact’ (1958) 7(1) AJCL 39; H Hahn, ‘Euratom: Conception of an International 
Personality’ (1958) 71(6) Harvard Law Review 1001; P Hay, ‘Patent Aspects of Domestic Law, 
Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency’ (1958) 56(4) MLR 770; J Hébert, 
‘Communauté européenne de l’énergie atomique’ (1965) 2(1) RTDEur 41; J Johnson, ‘An In-
troduction to Euratom’ (1957/1958) 13 Business Lawyer 801; P Mathijsen, ‘Problems Con-
nected with the Creation of Euratom’ (1961) 26(4) Law and Contemporary Problems 438; 
U Meyer-Cording, ‘Europa und der Euratomvertrag’ in Europa Union Deutschland (ed), 
Euratom: Wirtschaftliche und politische Probleme der Atomenergie (Europa-Union 1957); N 
Pelzer, ‘Die rechtliche Problematik der Beschränkung der deutschen Atomwirtschaft durch 
den Euratomvertrag’ (1962) Der Betrieb; L Scheinman, ‘Euratom: Nuclear Integration in 
Europe’ (1966/1967) 36(1) International Conciliation 1; G Vedel, ‘Euratom’ (1958) 9(2) Re-
vue économique 225; D Vigner and G Fischer, ‘Euratom’ (1956) 2(5) AFDI 695, etc. 
6 Eg K Ballerstedt, Das Eigentum an Kernbrennstoffen (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für 
Energierecht an der Universität Bonn 1962); TW Vogelaar, Het eigendomsrecht van Euratom 
over bijzondere splijstoffen (Gorcum & Comp NV 1961), etc. 
7 J Errera, E Symon, J Meulen and L Vernaeve, Euratom: Analyse et Commentaires du 
Traité (Librairie Encyclopédique 1958).
8 C Deubner, ‘The Final Crisis of Euratom’ (1979) 2(1) Current Research on Peace and Vi-
olence 53.
9 PM Barnes, ‘The Resurrection of the Euratom Treaty: Contributing to the Legal and Con-
stitutional Framework for Secure, Competitive and Sustainable Energy in European Union’ 
in T Etty and H Somsen (eds), Yearbook of European Environmental Law (OUP 2008); PM 
Barnes, The Politics of Nuclear Energy in the European Union. Framing the Discourse: Actors, 
Positions and Dynamics (Barbara Budrich Publishers 2018); I Cenevska, ‘The European 
Parliament and the European Atomic Energy Community: A Legitimacy Crisis?’ (2010) 35(3) 
ELR 415; C True, ‘EU-Kompetenzen für Energierecht, Gesundheitsschutz und Umwelt-
schutz und die Position der Euratom nach dem Verfassungsentwurf des Konvents’ (2004) 
Juristenzeitung 779; S Wolf, ‘Zur Zukunft des Euratom-Vertrags’ (2006) 29(4) Integration 
297; S Wolf, ‘Intergration durch Kernfusion? Zur Wiederbelebung der Euratom - Gründ-
ungsmythen’ (2007) 25(1) Forum Recht 26, etc.
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because the parents did not want it to live’,10 ‘a dormant serpent’,11 ‘an 
outsider’,12 ‘an invisible creature’,13 etc. 
The Euratom Community was referred to as having already been for-
gotten a decade after its establishment by some authors.14 Other authors 
have recently pointed out that the Euratom Community still represents a 
kind of terra incognita for scholars of EU law.15 In this respect, this article 
aims to analyse the Euratom Community from three different points of view. 
Firstly, the provisions providing for the further amendments, ad-
justments, and additional speciﬁ cation of the scope of application of the 
Treaty will be analysed. Taking the early stage of the nuclear industry 
into regard, these provisions were designed to reﬂ ect the further develop-
ments of this new industrial branch and allow for necessary changes in 
the Treaty. Having said this, the concept of the Euratom Community can 
be described a ‘provisional’ one. 
Secondly, the article will point out the existence of several provi-
sions which were originally drafted to give the Euratom Community 
certain competences, but which have never actually been used by the 
Community. Consequently, from this point of view, the Community can 
be regarded as a ‘static’ one. 
Thirdly, the Euratom Community will be analysed from the point of 
view of its recent norm-making activity. While originally intended mainly 
for the purposes of the further development of the nuclear industry, the 
Euratom Community has been gradually transformed into a Community 
establishing binding standards of nuclear safety in order to protect citi-
zens and the environment. Consequently, from this point of view, it can 
be regarded as a ‘ﬂ exible’ Community. 
The current 60th anniversary of the Treaty represents a good oppor-
tunity to deal in detail with the Euratom Community from these three 
different perspectives and, consequently, to revisit the characteristic fea-
tures of this Community. 
10 D Allen, ‘The Euratom Treaty, Chapter VI: New Hope or False Dawn?’ (1983) 20(3) CMLR 
473.
11 N Prieto Serrano, ‘Wakening the Serpent: Reﬂ ections on the Possible Modiﬁ cation of the 
Euratom Treaty’ (2006) 1(1) IJNucL 14.
12 I Cenevska, The European Atomic Energy Community in the European Union Context: The 
‘Outsider’ Within (Brill Nijhoff 2016). 
13 J Sellarés Sella, ‘El Euratom subsiste, invisible e incompatible con el tinglado comuni-
tario’ in JM Pérez de Nanclares (ed), El Tratado de Lisboa: la salida de la crisis constitucional 
(Iustel 2007).
14 TW Vogelaar, ‘Euratom: de vergeten gemeenschap’ (1967) 8(1) Nieuw Europa: maandblat 
van de Europese Beweging in Nederland 14. 
15 A Södersten, Euratom at the Crossroads (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018) 1. 
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2. A ‘provisional’ community 
When signing the text of the Treaty, the governments of the six States 
were aware that the newly born nuclear industry was in the stage of in-
fancy and its future developments were to a certain extent unpredictable. 
At the same time, in strict contrast to the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community of 1951,16 the Treaty was signed for an 
unlimited period of time (Article 208). Consequently, the signatories of 
the Treaty faced two contradictory interests: on the one hand, there was 
interest to support the speedy development of the nuclear industry, and 
on the other hand the signatories also aimed at the possibility of future 
adjustments and amendments of the applicable provisions if the circum-
stances so required.17 Consequently, while the building of the nuclear 
industry was given priority by the executives of the six States, there was 
also awareness of the potential danger arising from the further devel-
opment of this new technology.18 These two contradictory interests were 
reﬂ ected in several provisions of the Treaty, as outlined below. 
Several articles provided for the future amendment of the scope of 
the application of the Treaty. Here, the provisions facilitating the promo-
tion of nuclear research (Chapter 1) should be mentioned. In this area, 
the Treaty entrusted the Commission with the responsibility for pro-
moting and facilitating nuclear research in the Member States and for 
complementing it by carrying out a Community research and training 
programme. The activity of the Commission in this respect should be 
carried out within the ﬁ elds listed in Annex I to the Treaty.19 Commu-
nity research was to be carried out by a Joint Nuclear Research Centre, 
16 Article 97 provided that this Treaty was concluded for a period of ﬁ fty years from its entry 
into force.
17 The feeling of uncertainty concerning future developments of the nuclear industry was 
also reﬂ ected in other international conventions adopted in this period. For example, the 
Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 1960 deﬁ ned 
‘nuclear installations’, to which a special regime of liability and compensation is to be ap-
plied as ‘reactors other than those comprised in any means of transport; factories for the 
manufacture or processing of nuclear substances; factories for the separation of isotopes of 
nuclear fuel; factories for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel; facilities for the stor-
age of nuclear substances other than storage incidental to the carriage of such substances; 
and such other installations in which there are nuclear fuel or radioactive products or 
waste as the Steering Committee for Nuclear Energy of the Organisation  shall from time to 
time determine’. 
18 In this regard, it is interesting to mention that a serious nuclear accident happened in 
the Windscale facility on the northwest coast of England on 25 October 1957, ie seven 
months after the Treaty was signed by the six States. 
19 According to this Annex, the promoting and facilitating of nuclear research are to be 
carried out in the following ﬁ elds: raw materials, physics applied to nuclear energy, the 
physical chemistry of reactors, processing of radioactive materials, and the application of 
radioisotopes. 
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which was also commissioned by the Treaty to establish uniform nuclear 
terminology, a standard system of measurements and a central bureau 
for nuclear measurements. However, the scope of Community research 
was not considered to have been ﬁ nally decided,20 as Article 4 provided 
for the possibility to amend the scope of Annex I in the future.21 Chapter 
4, establishing a framework for facilitating investments in the nuclear in-
dustry, provides another example. Here, the Treaty provides that persons 
and undertakings engaged in the industrial activities listed in Annex II22 
should communicate to the Commission investment projects relating to 
new installations and also prospective replacements or conversions. The 
list of these industrial activities was also not considered to have been 
ﬁ nally decided, as Article 44 also provided for the possibility to amend 
the scope of Annex II in the future.23 Finally, a similar possibility was 
provided by Article 92 concerning the list of goods and products to be 
covered by the legal regime of the nuclear common market (Chapter 9).24
Further, several articles provided for the possibility of future ad-
justments of all the chapters of the Treaty. Such a possibility concerned 
Chapter 6, establishing a framework for supplies of ores, source materi-
als and special ﬁ ssile materials in the Community. This framework was 
intended to be executed by the Euratom Supply Agency, which was com-
missioned by exclusive right concerning any deliveries from outside the 
Community.25 However, Article 76 explicitly opened the possibility for the 
future adjustment of the whole chapter, underling its ‘provisional’ char-
20 J Grünwald, Das Energierecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften: EGKS, Euratom, EG. 
Grundlagen, Geschichte, geltende Regelungen (De Gruyter Recht 2003) 197−198. 
21 ‘This list may be amended by the Council, acting by a qualiﬁ ed majority on a proposal 
from the Commission. The latter shall consult the Scientiﬁ c and Technical Committee es-
tablished under Article 134.’
22 This Annex includes the mining of uranium and thorium ore, the concentration of such 
ores, the chemical processing and reﬁ ning of uranium and thorium concentrates, the 
preparation of nuclear fuels, in any form, the fabrication of nuclear fuel elements, the pro-
duction of uranium hexaﬂ uoride, the production of enriched uranium, the processing of 
irradiated fuels for the purpose of separating some or all of the elements contained therein, 
the production of reactor moderators, the production of hafnium free zirconium or com-
pounds thereof, nuclear reactors of all types and for all purposes, facilities for the industri-
al processing of radioactive waste, set up in conjunction with one or more of the facilities 
speciﬁ ed in the list, and semi industrial installations intended to prepare the way for the 
construction of plants involved in any of these activities.
23 ‘The list of industrial activities referred to above may be altered by the Council, acting by 
a qualiﬁ ed majority on a proposal from the Commission, which shall ﬁ rst obtain the opinion 
of the Economic and Social Committee.’
24 ‘The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to the goods and products speciﬁ ed in the lists 
forming Annex IV to this Treaty. These lists may, at the request of the Commission or of 
a Member State, be amended by the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission.’
25 P Mengozzi, L’ agenzia di Approvvigionamento dell’ Euratom (A Giuffré 1964) 22−24. 
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acter by setting an exact time limit for such adjustment.26 A very simi-
lar possibility for future adjustment was provided regarding the frame-
work of safeguards, as established in Chapter 7. Here, Article 85 did not 
contain any explicit time limit for such adjustment, but merely referred 
to prospective ‘new circumstances’.27 And ﬁ nally, ‘new circumstances’ 
were identiﬁ ed as the reason for future adjustment concerning Chapter 
9, which provides for a framework of the Community’s exclusive owner-
ship of special ﬁ ssile materials.28 In this regard, Article 90 provides legal 
ground for prospective adjustment.29 
Lastly, Article 197 also authorised the Council to further specify to 
which materials certain chapters are applicable.30 Such speciﬁ cation 
must be done by the Council by a qualiﬁ ed majority on a proposal from 
the Commission.
However, although several attempts have been made to use these 
provisions since the 1960s,31 none have been successful.  In particu-
lar, the provisions of Chapter 6, dealing with the common supply policy, 
have never been applied by the Commission vis-à-vis the Member States 
26 ‘On the initiative of a Member State or of the Commission, and particularly if unforeseen 
circumstances create a situation of general shortage, the Council may, acting unanimously 
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, amend 
the provisions of this Chapter. The Commission shall inquire into any request made by a 
Member State. Seven years after 1 January 1958, the Council may conﬁ rm these provisions 
in their entirety. Failing conﬁ rmation, new provisions relating to the subject matter of this 
Chapter shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in the preceding 
paragraph.’ 
27 ‘Where new circumstances so require, the procedures for applying the safeguards laid 
down in this Chapter may, at the request of a Member State or of the Commission, be 
adapted by the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament. The Commission shall examine any such request 
made by a Member State.’
28 See P Bohm, ‘Die juristische Problematik der europäischen Kernbrennstoffeigentums’ 
(1961) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1553;  P Bohm, ‘Ownership of Nuclear Materials 
in Euratom’ (1962) 11(2) AJCL 167; H Haedrich, ‘Das Eigentum der Europäischen Atom-
gemeinschaft an Kernbrennstoffen’ in Festschrift für C. F. Ophüls (Verlag Müller 1965); R 
Lukes, ‘Die Eigentumsregelungen für die besonderen spaltbaren Stoffen im Euratomver-
trag’ in Zweites Deutsches Atomrechts-Symposium (Carl Heymans 1974); G Vedel, ‘Le régime 
de propriété dans le Traité Euratom’ (1957) AFDI 586.
29 ‘Where new circumstances so require, the provisions of this Chapter relating to the Com-
munity’s right of ownership may, at the request of a Member State or of the Commission, 
be adjusted by the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament. The Commission shall examine any such request 
made by a Member State.,
30 This is the case of special ﬁ ssile materials, source materials and ores. 
31 For details about these attempts, see W Manig, Die Änderung der Vorsorgungs- und Si-
cherheitsvorschriften des Euratom-Vertrages durch die nachfolgende Praxis (Nomos Verlag 
1993) 125−127. 
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as foreseen in the Treaty.32 In this regard, the Court of Justice has had 
to deal with the question of whether these provisions remain valid or 
whether they have become obsolete in the meantime. In this regard, the 
Court argued, that: 
Even an abstention by the Council from exercising the powers which it 
holds under the second paragraph of Article 76 with a view to adapt-
ing the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Treaty in the light of experience, 
cannot have the effect of causing these provisions to lapse, either im-
mediately or at any subsequent date. Until the Council’s decision, the 
provisions of Chapter 6 are only maintained on a temporary basis, so 
that at any moment there may be substituted for them a set of new pro-
visions constituting a different supply system.33 
While conﬁ rming the temporary character of Chapter 6, the Court 
also argued that:
It cannot be presumed that provisions of the Treaty have lapsed. The 
Member States agreed to establish a Community of unlimited duration, 
having permanent institutions, invested with real powers, stemming 
from a limitation of authority or a transfer of powers from the States 
to that Community. Powers thus conferred cannot, therefore, be with-
drawn from the Community and restored to the Member States except 
by virtue of an express provision of the Treaty.34 
Hence, while approving the validity of the provisions of Chapter 6,35 
the Court also reafﬁ rmed the future possibility to provide for further 
adjustments.36 
The provisions of the Treaty also today still provide for the possi-
bility of further amendments, adjustments or speciﬁ cation of the scope 
of application. This provides the possibility to change the scope of ap-
plication of the Treaty without the need for further ratiﬁ cation by the 
Member States. Such a speciﬁ c regime concerns six out of ten chapters 
32 See I Alehno, ‘The Euratom Supply Agency: Past, Present and Future’ in Nuclear Inter 
Jura 2009 (Bruylant 2010); Allen (n 10);  A Bouquet, ‘How Current Are Euratom Provisions 
on Nuclear Supply and Ownership in View of the European Union’s Enlargement?’ (2001) 
68 NLB 7; T Cusack, ‘External Relations of the European Atomic Energy Community in the 
Fields of Supply and Safeguards: Backgrounds and Developments’ in Yearbook of European 
Law (OUP 1983); J Mennicken, ‘Die Gemeinschaftlichen Versorgung der EG-Staaten mit 
Kernbrennstoffen: Probleme der Euratom-Versorgungsagentur’ (1974) 34(7) Europa-Archiv 
747. 
33 Case C-7/71 Commission v French Republic [1971] ECR I−121, paras 23−26.
34 Ibid, paras 18−20.
35 E Gruber, ‘Das Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofes zur Fortgeltung der Ver-
sorgungsvorschriften des Euratomvertrages’ (1972) Atomwirtschaft 221, 221−222.
36 J Heber, ‘Observations sur l’arrêt rendu le 14 décembre 1971 par le Cour de justice des 
Communités européennes dans l’affaire7/71’ (1972) 9(4) RTDEur 299.
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of the Treaty, ie the framework for the promotion of research (Chapter 1), 
investments (Chapter 4), supplies (Chapter 6), safeguards (Chapter 7), 
property ownership (Chapter 8) and the common nuclear market (Chap-
ter 9). Consequently, the existence of these provisions underlines the 
peculiar nature of the Euratom Community. 
3. A static community 
Originally, the Treaty provided for a number of provisions37 aimed at 
reaching the goal to ‘create the conditions necessary for the development 
of a powerful nuclear industry’. One can identify several of these provi-
sions which have been used by the Euratom Community to address the 
speedy development of the nuclear industry:
1. Chapter 1 provides for the Community research and training 
programmes in its Article 7.38 The ﬁ rst of the programmes was 
established directly by the Treaty39 for the years 1958−1962. The 
second of the programmes was realised subsequently from 1963 
to 1967 with the development of Euratom’s own model of nuclear 
reactor.40 However, it took six years to ﬁ nd consensus on estab-
lishing the 3rd Community Research and Training Programme 
(1973−1976). Subsequently, research development became disin-
tegrated with support also coming from the programmes of the 
European Economic Community. Consequently, the 4th Commu-
nity Research and Training Programme was not started before 
1994 (from 1994 to 1998), followed by the 5th (1998−2000), 6th 
(2002−2006), 7th (2007−2011) and, most recently, the 8th Pro-
gramme (2014−2018). 
37 This concerns provisions on the promotion of research (Chapter 1), dissemination of 
information (Chapter 2), investments (Chapter 4), joint undertakings (Chapter 5), supplies 
(Chapter 6), property ownership (Chapter 8) and the common nuclear market (Chapter 9). 
38 ‘Community research and training programmes shall be determined by the Council, act-
ing unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, which shall consult the Scientiﬁ c 
and Technical Committee. These programmes shall be drawn up for a period of not more 
than ﬁ ve years. The funds required for carrying out these programmes shall be included 
each year in the research and investment budget of the Community. The Commission shall 
ensure that these programmes are carried out and shall submit an annual report thereon 
to the Council. The Commission shall keep the Economic and Social Committee informed of 
the broad outlines of Community research and training programmes.’
39 The ﬁ rst Community Research and Training Programme was established by the then 
existing Article 215 of the Treaty. The content of this programme was provided by Annex 
V to the Treaty. The text of this Annex is to be found in G Lake, ‘The Main Provisions of 
the Euratom Treaty’ in The European Parliament and the Euratom Treaty: Past, Present and 
Future (Directorate General for Research 2002).
40 The ‘ORGEL’ (ORGanique Eau Lourde) Project. 
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2. Chapter 4 provides for the publishing of Nuclear Illustrative Pro-
grammes (PINC) in its Article 40.41 The aim of these programmes 
is to facilitate coordinated development in investment efforts by 
undertakings in the nuclear industry. Altogether, six such illus-
trative programmes have been published.42 The recent Nuclear 
Illustrative Programme was launched in 2017.43
3. Chapter 5, providing for rules of joint undertaking, may serve as 
another good example of Euratom’s activity in this area.44 Based 
on these rules, eight joint undertakings were established under 
the aegis of the Euratom Community from 1961 to 1975, the ‘So-
ciété d’énergie nucléaire franco-belge des Ardennes (Senna)’ being 
the ﬁ rst of them.45 Recently, the ‘Fusion for Energy (F4E)’, estab-
lished to tackle the issue of nuclear fusion, represents the most 
salient example of such joint undertaking. 
However, a number of the Treaty’s provisions have remained un-
used due to the preference given to national instead of Community pro-
grammes (referred to as ‘nuclear nationalism’ by some authors46) or due 
to the hostility of certain Member States towards the execution of some 
of Euratom’s competences.47 
41 ‘In order to stimulate action by persons and undertakings and to facilitate coordinated 
development of their investment in the nuclear ﬁ eld, the Commission shall periodically 
publish illustrative programmes indicating in particular nuclear energy production targets 
and all the types of investment required for their attainment. The Commission shall obtain 
the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on such programmes before their pub-
lication.’ This provision was inspired by Article 46 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community of 1951.
42 In 1966, 1972, 1985, 1990, 1997 and 2007.
43 COM (2017) 237 ﬁ nal.
44 See C Colliard, ‘Les enterprises communes (OCDE et Euratom)’ (1979) 1 Journées soc 
législ comp 231; C Enger, ‘Internationale öffentliche Unternehmen’ (1995) 59 RabelsZ 495; 
E Libbrecht, ‘Les caractères essentiels des entreprises communes de l’Euratom› (1971) 7 
RTD Eur 623.
45 See Grünwald (n 20) 139−140 for a complete overview of these joint undertakings. 
46 Scheinman (n 5).
47 See G Andreini, ‘Euratom: An Instrument to Achieve a Nuclear Deterrent? French Nucle-
ar Independence and European Integration during the Mollet Government’ (2000) 6(1) Re-
vue d’Intégration Européenne 104; A Cocatre-Zilgien, ‘Euratom et Marché commun devant 
le Parlement français’ (1957) 3 AFDI 517; M O’Driscoll, ‘The Origins and Early History 
of Euratom, 1955−1968’ in The European Parliament and the Euratom Treaty: Past, Pres-
ent and Future (DG Research 2002); J Grünwald, ‘Euratom Treaty History and the Way 
Forward’ in Nuclear Inter Jura 2007: Proceedings/Actes du Congrés (Bruylant 2008); HL 
Nieburg, ‘European Atomic Energy Community: A Study in Coalition Politics ‘ (1963) 15(5) 
World Politics 597; CM Vassanelli, ‘Euratom: Critical Review of Selected Regulatory Func-
tions’ (1968−1969) 52(3) Marquette Law Review 355.
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The provisions of the Treaty offer numerous examples48 of compe-
tences unused by the Euratom Community for one or both of the reasons 
mentioned above:
1. The establishing of an institution of university status, dealing 
with nuclear education, was foreseen in Article 9. However, due 
to the obvious preference given to national research programmes 
instead of common research undertakings, such an institution 
has never been established. 
2. Further, Charter 6, dealing with supplies of ores, source mate-
rials and special ﬁ ssile materials, provides for several examples 
of competences unused due to the hostility of certain Member 
States. Thus, the Commission has never made any appropriate 
recommendations regarding revenue or mining regulations as 
provided for in Article 71. Neither the commercial, nor the emer-
gency stocks of ores, source materials and special ﬁ ssile mate-
rials, as provided for in Article 72, have ever been established. 
The Euratom Supply Agency has also never used its right of op-
tion (Article 57), nor has it used its exclusive right (Article 64) 
concerning deliveries of ores, source materials and special ﬁ s-
sile materials from third States. Instead of these competences, a 
simpliﬁ ed contracting procedure has been gradually introduced, 
as foreseen in Article 66.49 Consequently, the concept of the ex-
clusive ownership by the Euratom Community of special ﬁ ssile 
materials, as established by Chapter 8 (Article 86), remains ‘an 
empty shell’.50
3. Finally, a directive ‘to facilitate the conclusion of insurance con-
tracts covering nuclear risks’ (Article 98) has never been issued 
by the Council.51 In this case, the reason for Euratom inactivity52 
48 For a detail overview of such ‘dormant’ competences, see J Grünwald, ‘From Challenge to 
Response: Dormant Powers in Euratom Law’ in C Raetzke (ed), Nuclear Law in the EU and 
Beyond (Nomos Verlag 2014).
49 ‘Should the Commission ﬁ nd, on application by the users concerned, that the Agency 
is not in a position to deliver within a reasonable period of time all or part of the supplies 
ordered, or that it can only do so at excessively high prices, the users shall have the right 
to conclude directly contracts relating to supplies from outside the Community, provided 
that such contracts meet in essential respects the requirements speciﬁ ed in their orders.’
50 A Bouquet, ‘The Mysteries of the Euratom Community’s Ownership Right’ in V Lamm 
(ed), Nuclear Inter Jura (Archaeolingua 2002). 
51 M Wathelet, ‘Clariﬁ cation de la base légale pour une intervention au niveau de l’UE dans 
le domaine de la responsabilité nucléaire’ in M Beyens, D Philippe, P Reyners (eds), Pros-
pects of a Civil Nuclear Liability Regime in the Framework of the European Union (Bruylant 
2012).
52 In this respect, two recommendations were issued by the Euratom Community to ad-
dress the issue. See the Commission Recommendation 65/42/Euratom of 28 October 
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was the fact that a regional legal framework covering the ﬁ eld of 
nuclear liability and compensation was established in the mean-
time by corresponding international conventions.
However, the Treaty has survived the last 60 years without any con-
siderable amendments. Most of the changes in the text of the Treaty,53 
made over the last decades, were driven by the accession of new Member 
States and the subsequent need to reﬂ ect these Member States in the in-
stitutional structure of the Community.54 Consequently, at the beginning 
of the new millennium, the Treaty became subject to vigorous criticism. 
Hence, it was argued, that the Treaty was ‘outdated, undemocratic, and 
biased towards the electronuclear industry’.55 
If the EEC was initially predominantly ‘functional’, the EU is now pre-
dominantly (or at least increasingly) ‘humanist’.56 The Euratom has not 
undergone the same evolution.  In contrast to the EU, the Euratom’s 
tasks (or objectives) have never been amended. They are the same as 
when the Treaty was adopted.57 
Reﬂ ecting this criticism, several proposals addressing the question 
of Euratom were prepared at the beginning of the new millennium.58 
1965 [1965] OJ 196/2995 and the Commission Recommendation 66/22/Euratom of 6 
July 1966 on the harmonisation of legislation applying the 1960 Paris Convention [1966] 
OJ 136/2553.
53 For a very detailed overview of these changes, see J Grünwald, ‘Neuere Entwicklungen 
des Euratom-Rechts’ (1998) 1 Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien 276, fn 6. 
54 It was the Merger Treaty of 1965 (entered into force on 1 July 1967) which combined the 
executive bodies of the three European Communities (the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic Communi-
ty) into a single institutional structure. 
55 It was argued that in the framework of the Treaty, there is ‘no requirement for the Council 
to do anything more than formally consult the European Parliament on substantive issues. 
Under the provisions of the Treaty, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Scientiﬁ c and Technical Committee do have similar consultation role as the European 
Parliament. In addition, Article 101 excludes the European Parliament from involvement 
in international agreements based on its terms’. For further details of this criticism, see 
P Barnes (n 9) 193−194. A more positive view on Euratom was presented in J Grünwald, 
‘Euratom − Vertrag: nie war er so wertvoll wie heute’ (2000) 11(4) Europäische Zeitschrift 
für Wirtschaftsrecht 481.
56 A Södersten (n 15) 67−68.
57 Ibid. 
58 The Penelope Proposal aimed to address the question of Euratom by abolishing the pro-
visions of Chapter 6 (supplies), Chapter 8 (property ownership) and Chapter 9 (Common 
nuclear market) as these were considered obsolete. Further, the provisions of Chapter 3 
(health and safety), Chapter 4 (investments), Chapter 5 (joint undertakings) and Chapter 7 
(safeguards) were intended to be incorporated into the text of a new Regulation, dealing with 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Praesidium Proposal aimed at the further existence of 
the Treaty. However, Article 184, granting Euratom a legal personality, was intended to be 
cancelled. Finally, the Nagy Proposal aimed at the full abolishment of the Treaty and at the 
incorporation of the provisions on health and safety into the text of the Treaty establishing a 
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However, none of these proposals were accepted and the further exis-
tence of the Treaty was subsequently conﬁ rmed by the Treaty of Lisbon 
in 2007.59 
Thus, after six decades of Euratom’s existence, ‘the conditions nec-
essary for the development of a powerful nuclear industry’ as provided 
for by the Treaty remain in their original version. The Euratom Com-
munity continues to exist as an independent legal personality, parallel 
to the European Union. The legal framework that has been established 
by the Euratom Community has the nature of leges speciales in relation 
to the legal framework established by the European Union. And conse-
quently, the latter is to be applied subsidiarily in cases where explicit 
special regulation is missing.60
4. A ﬂ exible community
In her paper on Euratom Community perspectives at the start of 
the new millennium, Christiane True gave several reasons for the static 
nature of the Treaty.61 The unwillingness of the majority of the Mem-
ber States to pursue any considerable amendment of the Treaty was ex-
plained by the delicate nature of the subject, by the existence of a num-
ber of contradictory interests, and also by the fact that the Treaty itself 
does not provide for any explicit obligation to use nuclear energy in the 
territory of the Member States. However, the Treaty has also proved to 
be quite ﬂ exible, in particular in the protection of health and safety. This 
is due to the fact that while the competences conferred to Euratom orig-
inally included only the ﬁ eld of radiological protection, they were later 
interpreted in a broader sense also to cover issues of nuclear safety. 
 Here, Chapter 3 provides for several competences of the European 
Commission in the area of health and safety. These competences are 
classiﬁ ed62 as general competences and special competences. Under gen-
Constitution for Europe. For details, see M Jasper, ‘Vertragsentwurf des europäischen Kon-
vents und mögliche Konsequenzen für das Energie- bzw. Atomrecht’ (2003) 7(3) Zeitschrift 
für neues Energierecht 292; and C True, ‘The Euratom Community Treaty´s Prospects at 
the Start of the New Millennium’ (2006) 1(1) IJNucL 247.
59 Protocol No. 2 to the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007 introduced several amendments to the 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, which were, however, rather 
of an institutional and ﬁ nancial nature. The newly introduced Article 106a provides which 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union are also to be applicable to Euratom. 
60 An outstanding overview of mutual relations between both legal frameworks is presented 
in R Ptasekaite, The Euratom Treaty vs Treaties of the European Union: Limits of Competence 
and Interaction (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority 2011) 30. 
61 True (n 58).
62 Grünwald (n 20) 223−224. 
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eral competence (Article 38), the European Commission should make 
recommendations to the Member States regarding the level of radioac-
tivity in the air, water and soil.63 Further, the Commission possesses 
several special competences in this area. In the ﬁ rst place, any Mem-
ber State in whose territories particularly dangerous experiments are to 
take place must take additional health and safety measures, on which 
they must ﬁ rst obtain the opinion of the Commission (Article 34). Addi-
tionally, the Commission has the right of access to facilities carrying out 
continuous monitoring of the level of radioactivity in the air, water and 
soil and it may verify their operation and efﬁ ciency (Article 35). Finally, 
Article 37 authorises the Commission to issue opinions on the plans of 
the Member States for the disposal of radioactive waste in whatever form.
However, it was the norm-making competence of the Euratom Com-
munity in the area of health and safety which gradually became a tool 
to address a relative wide range of issues. Pursuant to Article 30, basic 
standards are to be laid down within the Community for the protection 
of the health of workers and the general public against dangers arising 
from ionising radiation.64 These basic standards are to be worked out by 
the Commission after it has obtained the opinion of a group of persons 
appointed by the Scientiﬁ c and Technical Committee from among sci-
entiﬁ c experts, and in particular public health experts, in the Member 
States. The Commission must obtain the opinion of the Economic and 
Social Committee on these basic standards (Article 31). In this respect, 
each Member State is obliged to lay down the appropriate provisions, 
whether by legislation, regulation or administrative action, to ensure 
compliance with the basic standards which have been established. 
The question of the applicability of the rules laid down in Chapter 
3 has become the subject of several decisions rendered by the Court of 
Justice. 
1. On one hand, the Court had to deal with the question of whether 
the provisions of Chapter 3 are also applicable to military in-
stallations.65 Concerning the application of Article 37 (plans for 
63 Further, in cases of urgency, Article 38 authorises the Commission to issue a ‘directive’ 
requiring the Member State concerned to take, within a period laid down by the Commis-
sion, all necessary measures to prevent infringement of the basic standards and to ensure 
compliance with regulations. 
64 Pursuant to Article 30, these basic standards must contain maximum permissible doses 
compatible with adequate safety, maximum permissible levels of exposure and contamina-
tion, and fundamental principles governing the health surveillance of workers.
65 The text of the Treaty is silent concerning its applicability (or inapplicability) to military 
installations. The only indirect reference to these types of installations is contained in Ar-
ticle 84, which provides that ‘the safeguards may not extend to materials intended to meet 
defence requirements which are in the course of being specially processed for this purpose 
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the disposal of radioactive waste) to a military installation,66 the 
Court argued that: 
The evidence on interpretation to be taken into consideration cannot 
be limited to the historical background to the drawing up of the Treaty, 
or to the contents of the unilateral declarations made by the represent-
atives of certain States who took part in the negotiations which led to 
the signature of that Treaty. As the Advocate General rightly pointed 
out in points 80 and 81 of his Opinion, it is clear from that background 
and certain declarations mentioned in the travaux préparatoires of the 
Treaty that its possible application to the military uses of nuclear en-
ergy was envisaged and discussed by the representatives of the States 
who took part in those negotiations. However, it is also apparent that 
they held differing opinions on that issue and that they decided to leave 
it unresolved. Consequently, the guidance provided by that evidence 
is not sufﬁ cient for it to be asserted that the framers of the Treaty in-
tended to make its provisions applicable to military installations and 
military applications of nuclear energy.67 
However, the Court also stated, that: 
An interpretation of Article 37 to the effect that the Member State con-
cerned might decide both the time from which a military source of radi-
oactive waste must be regarded as civil waste and the actual content of 
the data which must be communicated to the Commission would be in 
contradiction with the purpose of that provision. (…) Furthermore, an 
interpretation of Article 37 which allowed Member States such discre-
tion as to the time for communicating data and its content would be a 
or which, after being so processed, are, in accordance with an operational plan, placed or 
stored in a military establishment’. Further, Article 86 stipulates, that ‘the Community’s 
right of ownership shall extend to all special ﬁ ssile materials which are produced or im-
ported by a Member State, a person or an undertaking and are subject to the safeguards 
provided for in Chapter 7’. Consequently, it used to be argued that Chapter 7 (safeguards) 
and Chapter 8 (property ownership) are not applicable to any military installations. On the 
contrary, according to some interpretations, the provisions of other chapters were to be 
applied also to military facilities. Such an interpretation was underlined by the fact that 
France proceeded according to Article 34 when experimenting with nuclear explosions in 
the Sahara at the beginning of the 1960s. Besides, Article 52, which provides that the 
Euratom Supply Agency ‘may not discriminate in any way between users on grounds of the 
use which they intend to make of the supplies requested unless such use is unlawful’, was 
interpreted in favour of the applicability of Chapter 6 (supplies) on military installations. In 
detail, see A Breda, ‘Alla ricerca del delicato equilibrio tra protezione della salute e difesa 
della sicurezza nazionale nell’ ambito del Trattato Euratom’ (2005) 2(4) DPCE 1126.
66 The case concerned the Jason reactor that was operated by the United Kingdom Ministry 
of Defence at the Royal Naval College Greenwich from 1962 to 1996. During this time, it 
was used to train naval and dockyard personnel in reactor physics and as a research tool in 
support of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme of the Ministry of Defence. At the end 
of this period, Jason was dismantled upon the successful application for authorisation to 
the United Kingdom’s Environment Agency for England and Wales.
67 Case C-61/03 Commission v United Kingdom [2005] ECR I−2477, para 29.
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source of dispute and would undermine the effective application of that 
provision.68 
In another case, the Court had to deal with the issue of the appli-
cability of the basic standards to the operation of a nuclear-powered 
vessel.69 In this respect, the Court argued that: 
To accept that in such a situation the obligation laid down in (…) the 
directive is incumbent none the less on Member States would amount 
to recognising that the provisions of the Treaty concerning health and 
safety, in particular Article 31, which provides the basis for that di-
rective, are different in scope from the other provisions of that Treaty. 
Whether the provisions of that Treaty applied to activities within the 
military sphere would thus depend on the nature and scope of the ob-
ligations which those provisions impose on Member States. It would 
therefore be necessary to assess in each case the damage which perfor-
mance of those obligations may cause to the essential national defence 
interests of those States.70 
Consequently, the Court argued, that ‘as the scope of provisions of 
secondary legislation cannot validly exceed that of their legal basis, the 
inapplicability of Article 31 to military activities necessarily means that 
the directive does not apply to such activities’.71 Consequently, the pro-
visions of the Treaty proved to be ﬂ exible enough to respect certain vital 
interests of its Member States in the area of defence policy by enabling a 
rather restrictive interpretation of its scope.72
2. On the other hand, the Court had to deal with the question of 
to what extent Chapter 3 is applicable to the issues of nuclear 
safety. The Treaty lacks any explicit reference to the safety of 
nuclear installations. Consequently, the signatories of the Treaty 
68 Ibid, paras 40−41. 
69 This case concerned the nuclearpowered Royal Navy submarine HMS Tireless, docked 
in the harbour of Gibraltar for repair operations following a minor incident with its nuclear 
propulsion reactor while on the Mediterranean Sea. These repair operations lasted until 
May 2001. In the course of 2000, the Commission received six complaints relating to the 
repair operations, which led it to request the United Kingdom government to provide in-
formation regarding the operations and the information given to the public about health 
protection measures to be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
70 Case C-65/04 Commission v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I−2239, paras 24−25.
71 Ibid, para 27. 
72 However, in Case C-65/04, the Court also stated, that ‘it is important to note, however, 
that that ﬁ nding does not by any means reduce the vital importance of the objective of pro-
tecting the health of the public and the environment against the dangers related to the use 
of nuclear energy, including for military purposes. In so far as the EAEC Treaty does not 
provide the Community with a speciﬁ c instrument in order to pursue that objective, it is 
possible that appropriate measures might be adopted on the basis of the relevant provisions 
of the EC Treaty’ (para 28).
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were originally not willing to commission Euratom with any com-
petences in this sensitive ﬁ eld. Therefore, Euratom restricted its 
activities here to two unbinding recommendations.73 This kind of 
response to the issues of nuclear safety, arising in the post-Cher-
nobyl period, was not considered appropriate by many stakehold-
ers. Thus, it was felt that ‘the fact that the Member States retain 
exclusive competence over the technological aspects of nuclear 
safety does not prevent the Community from adopting legislation 
which establishes certain safety requirements, authorisation re-
quirements, inspection and assessment requirements or enforce-
ment mechanisms’.74  
Consequently, dealing with the issue of the Community’s accession 
to the Convention on Nuclear Safety of 1994, the Court argued, that: 
Even though the Euratom Treaty does not grant the Community com-
petence to authorise the construction or operation of nuclear installa-
tions, under Articles 30 to 32 of the Euratom Treaty the Community 
possesses legislative competence to establish, for the purpose of health 
protection, an authorisation system which must be applied by the Mem-
ber States. Such a legislative act constitutes a measure supplementing 
the basic standards referred to in that article. (…) Under Article 37 
of the Euratom Treaty, the Community possesses competence as re-
gards ‘any plan for the disposal of radioactive waste in whatever form’ 
if the implementation of that plan is liable to result in the radioactive 
contamination of the water, soil or airspace of another Member State. 
That fact provides sufﬁ cient grounds to conclude that the Community 
possesses competence in the ﬁ eld covered by Article 17 of the Conven-
tion.  The measures required by Articles 18 and 19 of the Convention 
concerning the design, construction and operation of nuclear installa-
tions can be the subject of the provisions which the Member States lay 
down to ensure, in accordance with the ﬁ rst paragraph of Article 33 of 
the Euratom Treaty, compliance with the basic standards. However, the 
Commission has competence to make recommendations for harmonis-
ing those provisions, as is clear from the second paragraph of Article 33 
of the Euratom Treaty, interpreted in the light of the considerations set 
out in paragraphs 75 to 83 of the present judgment. The Member States 
are required to assist in drawing up those recommendations through 
the communications referred to in the third paragraph of Article 33 of 
the Euratom Treaty.75 
73 Published in 1975 and 1992. 
74 Case C-29/99 Commission v Council [2001] ECR I−860, Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras 
166−167.
75 Case C-29/99 Commission v Council [2002] ECR I−734, paras 89, 103 and 105.
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While being originally intended mainly76 for the purposes of the 
further development of the nuclear industry (in particular by promot-
ing nuclear energy by common research activities, investment coordi-
nation and establishing joint undertakings), Euratom has been gradu-
ally transformed into a Community establishing binding standards of 
nuclear safety in order to protect citizens and the environment.77 The 
extensive interpretation of the competences arising from the Treaty 
opened the doors for a new period of legislative activity.78 In 2009, the 
issue of nuclear safety became the subject of legal regulation under the 
Euratom Community.79 Subsequently, in 2011, a directive was issued to 
address the issue of safety regarding spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management.80 In response to the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, 
risk and safety assessments (‘stress tests’) were carried out on all nu-
clear power plants situated in the territory of the Euratom Community. 
Neighbouring countries were also associated with this, and Switzerland 
and Ukraine participated fully. Beyond this, the European Commission 
encouraged and cooperated with nuclear regulators around the world 
to perform similar exercises. The aim of the assessments was to check 
whether the safety standards used when speciﬁ c power plants received 
their licences were sufﬁ cient to cover unexpected extreme events. Spe-
ciﬁ cally, the tests measured the ability of nuclear facilities to withstand 
damage from hazards such as earthquakes, ﬂ ooding, terrorist attacks or 
aircraft collisions. Subsequently, the results of these ‘stress tests’ were 
reﬂ ected in the amendment of the nuclear safety directive in 2014.81
Further, the Euratom Community also became involved in nucle-
ar safety cooperation with third countries, in particular through the 
76 Only ten out of 106 articles of Title II of the Treaty originally dealt with the issues of 
protection of health and safety. In contrast to this, 18 articles were devoted to issues of 
dissemination of information, licences and patents in the nuclear ﬁ eld, and 21 articles dealt 
with issues of the supply of ores, source materials and special ﬁ ssile materials.
77 W Schroeder, ‘Die Euratom − auf dem Weg zu einer Umweltgemeinschaft’ (1995) 7(2) 
Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 322.
78 See M Garribba, A Chirtes and M Nauduzaite, ‘The Directive Establishing a Community 
Framework for the Nuclear Safety of Nuclear Instrallations’ (2009) 84 Nuclear Law Bulletin 
23; I Kacem, ‘Safety for Nuclear Installations, Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste 
Management in the European Union: A Legal Analysis’ (2004) 13(2) EEER 109; M Sousa 
Ferro, ‘The Future of Regulation of Nuclear Safety in the EU’ (2008) 2(2) IJNucL 149.
79 Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community frame-
work for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations [2009] OJ L172/18.
80 Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011 establishing a Community frame-
work for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste [2011] 
OJ L199/48.
81 Council Directive 2014/87/Euratom of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 2009/71/Eur-
atom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations 
[2014] OJ L219/42.
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platform called ‘Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)’. The 
ﬁ rst INSC was established82 for the period 2007 to 2013 to support EU 
activities and promote the highest levels of nuclear safety, radiation pro-
tection and effective nuclear safeguards globally. In 2013, a second INSC 
was established83 for the period 2014 to 2020, with a total budget of 225 
million. Major elements of INSC cooperation with third countries have 
recently included the promotion and development of effective regulatory 
frameworks, technical support to nuclear regulatory bodies, and nation-
al technical safety organisations. Activities have expanded to the ﬁ eld 
of nuclear safeguards, radioactive waste management and emergency 
preparedness. 
Taking these very recent developments into consideration, it can be 
seen that this new role of Euratom is far from the role originally con-
ferred to this Community by the signatories of the Treaty. However, this 
new role has naturally become the subject of criticism in the sense that 
it exceeds the limits established by the Member States in the text of the 
Treaty.84
5. Conclusions
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 
has largely remained in its original version of 1957 until today. Given its 
age and its largely unamended state, the Treaty has often been called a 
‘fossil’, particularly by those who wish to phase out nuclear technology for 
energy generation altogether. There are also some features that are open 
to more general criticisms: these include provisions which do not appear 
to meet today’s requirements, the existence of provisions of a provisional 
nature, and of provisions which have never been applied as intended by 
the signatories of the Treaty. Very recently, Anna Södersten has argued 
that ‘while the Euratom has some important functions, the EU could 
equally perform many of these functions’ and that ‘given the expansion 
of EU competencies, there is no longer a need for the Euratom Treaty as a 
separate body’.85 However, the new millennium led to a considerable shift 
in Euratom’s legislation: following the judgment of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union concerning Euratom’s accession to the Convention 
on Nuclear Safety (2001), directives regulating the area of nuclear safety 
82 Council Regulation (Euratom) No 300/2007 of 19 February 2007 establishing an Instru-
ment for Nuclear Safety Cooperation [2007] OJ L81/1.
83 Council Regulation (Euratom) No 237/2014 of 13 December 2013 establishing an Instru-
ment for Nuclear Safety Cooperation [2014] OJ L77/109.
84 M Sousa Ferro, ‘Directive 2009/71/Euratom: The Losing Battle against Discrimination 
and Protection of Sovereignty’ (2009) 2(3) International Journal of Nuclear Law 295.
85 Södersten (n 15) 234. 
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and radioactive waste management have been enacted. Thus, although 
intended to be a ‘provisional’ Community, Euratom has been gradually 
transformed into an ‘environmental Community’86 establishing binding 
legal norms for the protection of citizens and the environment, in partic-
ular in the ﬁ eld of nuclear safety. This new role of Euratom is quite far 
removed from the original purpose of the Community, which was in the 
beginning intended to support the growth of the nuclear industry rather 
than to impose safety restrictions on it. It is not a ‘serpent’87 that we see 
here. Neither is it a phoenix,88 cyclically regenerating itself from its own 
ashes. Euratom is a true chameleon.
86 Schroeder (n 77).
87 Prieto Serrano (n 11) 14. 
88 Barnes, ‘The Resurrection of the Euratom Treaty’ (n 9) 182. 
